Countries around the world have embarked in significant decentralization programs over the last decades for a variety of reasons. The latter include political bottom-up democratic pressures, fear of national territorial disintegration from ethnic or cultural separatist demands, or simply disillusion with centralized systems of economic governance and the need to improve the overall efficiency of the public sector.
The decentralization of the delivery of public goods and services should be followed by the implementation of a system of revenue assignments and inter-governmental fiscal grants that ensures the adequate financing of the functions decentralized to sub-national units of government and equity in the distribution of resources. Generally, it is economically efficient to decentralize expenditure responsibilities to a larger extent than revenue sources. However, this tends to generate vertical fiscal imbalances across levels of government that need to be addressed with an adequately designed system of grants.
As grants become an integral part of the budgetary structure of sub-national levels of government, they have proved vulnerable to the kind of political bargaining that affects any other government policy. The end result of such a game may be the sub-optimal allocation of resources to regional and municipal government if political interests are primed over technical and policy principles. This paper analyzes the different mechanisms through which political interests may have affected the distribution of regional financing in Spain. We benefit from a complete fiscal dataset developed by the Spanish Ministry of Finance that allows testing all major hypotheses on the political determinants of regional financing found in the literature. It additionally allows us to define unique, country-specific mechanisms to Spain that reflect the political structure of power in the country and its legislative system. The paper is structured as follows. First, the economic principles underpinning an efficient system of regional financing are discussed in Section 1. In Section 2, we provide some background on Spain's decentralized system of government and political reality.
The hypotheses, data and model used for estimation are outlined in Section 3, while Section 4 discusses the regression results obtained. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
Normative and Positive Foundations of an Intergovernmental Fiscal System
The implementation of a system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is motivated, according to normative economic theory, by the aim of increasing efficiency and equity in the distribution of resources across levels of governments (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972; Gramlich 1977) . Sub-national governments should assume responsibility over the delivery of public services for which they can maximize the tradeoff between losses in economies of scale from centralized production and the benefits from tailoring goods and services to the local electorates. This principle of subsidiarity, enunciated by Oates in 1972 , provides the building block of the modern theory of fiscal decentralization.
Despite the fact sub-national governments may be more efficient at delivering certain goods and services, the uneven distribution of the economic base of a country limits the capacity of sub-national governments to finance them. Thus, for efficiency sake, the central component of a system of intergovernmental fiscal relations would include grant mechanisms that address the fiscal gap between a region's expenditure needs and its fiscal capacity. In addition, should equitable development be a policy concern, intergovernmental fiscal grant systems can assist in reducing disparities in the development levels across sub-national governments. The general goal would be to assist poorer sub-national governments (regardless of the nature of the observed disparities) to reach levels of development at least similar to the national averages. Best practices advise that separate fiscal mechanisms are devised to distribute funds aimed at efficiency and equity objectives. However, certain grant instruments may allow tackling both the efficiency and equity goals defined.
The central argument of the public choice school, centered on the positive aspects of fiscal decentralization, is the assumption of civil servants (and politicians) as selfish utility-maximizers that will aim to increase their power by maximizing the size of their budgets (Buchanan 1962) . In their view, the distribution of fiscal resources to subnational governments would be less a function of efficiency or equity criteria and more related to the vested interests of those with the power to define fiscal policies.
The argument is straight-forward: politicians will try to implement the system of transfers that better maximizes their own utility, or in more concrete terms, their chances of (re)election. In a democratic state where members of the national Parliament are elected locally, there will be an electoral incentive for politicians to increase the level of transfers to their particular regions. Depending on how the politics play, the process may lead to overspending and/or unequal distribution of fiscal resources (Besley and Coate 2003) .
Avenues for Political Influence
The analysis of the political determinants of fiscal transfer systems has a seminal reference in Wright's (1974) analysis of the distribution of New Deal funds to states in the U.S.A. Wright found that political variables had greater explanatory power than economic ones in explaining the pattern of transfer distribution. More recently, a twelvecountry review of the determinants of intergovernmental grants by Boex and MartinezVázquez (2005) concludes that the political influence of sub-national governments, and not just efficiency or equity considerations, is an important aspect of transfers' distributive patterns.
The literature has explored a number of avenues through which politics may influence intergovernmental fiscal relations. The general model of reference is that of Dixit and Londregan (1998) . Under certain conditions, they conclude parties would respond to political productivity incentives. Thus, regions with a higher share of swing voters will be most likely to receive more transfers. Using the same framework, Johansson (2003) finds evidence that intergovernmental grants were used in Sweden from 1981-1995 as an instrument to improve electoral chances.
Evidence of political influence on the distribution of transfers is widespread. Rao and Singh (2001) show that states in India with greater political bargaining power receive larger per capita transfers. Similarly, Worthington and Dollery (1995) , and Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) find that the federal governments of Australia and Argentina respectively used the transfer instruments to buy political capital and increase reelection chances. The results are also evident in the analysis of supranational institutions, as Rodden (2002) observes a linear positive relationship between voting power of European Union states and transfers per capita received from equity-targeted Structural Funds.
The choice of political explanatory variables in the literature adequately depends on the form of the democratic and electoral system in place in the country under study. A good review is offered in Warwick and Druckman's (2006) study of portfolio allocation in coalition governments. Surveying the political science literature in the area, they argue academia has favored traditionally number of seats in parliament as a measure of bargaining power (Gamson 1961, Browne and Franklin 1973) . Accordingly, Rao and Singh (2001) use the proportion of the ruling party's Members of Parliament (lower house only) coming from a particular state in India, and a variable measuring whether the same party was in power at the center and the state level. Reflecting the particularities of their representative systems, Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) use instead senators and deputies per capita, per Argentinean province, whereas for Dixit and Lonegan (1998) and Johansson (2003) , the critical variable is the number of swing voters by state.
More qualitative variables exploring the avenues for political influence into regional financing levels have additionally been used in the literature. In their analysis of the distribution of New Deal's transfers, Anderson and Tollison (1991) propose parliamentarians' length of tenure, and the holding of critical positions (such as Speaker of the House, or Head of a Committee) in order to distinguish between "powerful" members of Congress and those less able to influence policy decisions. In one of the more complete studies to date, Worthington and Dollery (1995) use the total number of seats of each state in the Australian federal parliament, the proportion of seats held by the incumbent government in each state, and whether the same party is in power at the federal and state level as avenues for political influence in regional financing levels. They also however introduce qualitative dummy variables for elections, recognizing periods in which the distribution of political bargaining may vary from the norm; and, following Bungey et al. (1991) , a voting productivity variable is introduced defined as "the proportion of federal seats in the state held with a less than five percent two-party preferred margin". The latter variable is meant to control for the fact that a state with more "closely fought seats" may receive a larger share of the transfers if political calculations are at play.
The use of voting power indexes to estimate political bargaining power in the legislature has received increasing attention. Rodden (2003) uses the Shapley-Shubik index to estimate the relative power of European Union countries at the European Parliament and Council of Ministers, and finds overrepresentation is linked to increased transfers to smaller states. Equally, Pitlik et al (2001) , using the same index, find that smaller, but overrepresented, German länder are able to effectively use their bargaining power in the legislative process to ensure additional financial resources.
In the next section we discuss the relevance of the explanatory variables used in the literature to identify the political drivers of regional financing and describe unique, country-specific patterns that inform our empirical model.
Spain's Political Scenario and Intergovernmental Fiscal System
The initial multiplication of political parties during the first Spanish democratic national elections after Franco's dictatorship has given way to acute political concentration, with two major national parties, the social-democrats (PSOE) and the center-right (PP) alternating in power since 1982. The political and electoral system also produced a smaller left-wing national coalition led by the former communists (IU) and, more importantly for our research focus, a group of regionalist parties that have traditionally accounted for key representation at the national parliament while leading their respective regional governments. These include Convergencia i Unió (CiU) and the Nationalist Basque Party (PNV) both located at the center-right of the ideological spectrum. Spain is currently divided into 17 regions (Autonomous Communities) plus two autonomous cities (Ceuta y Melilla), which in turn include 50 provinces and over 8.000 municipalities. The current political system, were regionalist parties are allowed to obtain representation at the national parliament, was partly designed to respond to the longsuppressed demands for self-government in regions like Catalonia, or the Basque Country. In return for the capacity to influence national political developments, plus the definition of a vertical structure of government with ample flexibility for regional self- Table 1 ). Consistently, both PSOE and PP have resorted to regionalist parties, mostly CiU and PNV, as preferred coalition partners 3 . 
Spain's System of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
Spain's constitutional framework states that the regional financial system should be based on the principles of autonomy (regions should have authority to increase or decrease their revenue collection at the margin), sufficiency (regional governments should have enough funds for the delivery of devolved expenditures), solidarity (inter-territorial redistribution to assess different levels of development and fiscal capacity has to be implemented) and coordination between all public administrations (Herrero 2005 ).
In line with those principles, the regional financial system has been structured along the following instruments:
1. The so-called "devolved taxes", which mainly include those taxing the property and transfer of wealth, over which all regional governments are empowered with administrative powers.
2. The "shared" taxes (existing from 1993), which include the personal income tax (where Autonomous Communities enjoy some normative power), the value added tax and most of existing excise taxes.
3. The formerly called Sufficiency Fund, which works as a form of revenue sharing with equalization purposes, allocates proportionally more resources to those territories with a low fiscal capacity and/or high expenditure needs 4 . Although the criteria defined for the distribution of the fund have traditionally included an important amount of variables that intended to assess differences in the cost of providing services across the regions (such as poverty rates, insularity, etc.), reforms have continuously increased the relative importance of regional population in the expenditure needs index. An analysis of the general dynamics of regional financing in Spain should thus include this and any other source of regional funding that may have been used as a bargaining chip between the central and regional levels of government.
The regional financing system has been reviewed every five years. The approval of reforms requires a compulsory absolute majority at the Congress (50 percent of votes plus 1). Single majority in the upper house (Senate) is also required for a reform to be approved, but even rejection in the Senate could be overruled by a second majority in the Congress. The general reform trend over the years has typically consisted on an increase 10 Furthermore, after 1996 they were empowered to regulate the basic elements of the devolved taxes (including the personal income tax). 11 This tax sharing system does not include, in most of the cases, regulatory and administrative powers. Therefore, indirect taxes are still subject to a uniform normative framework all over the country.
of regional tax resources (mostly tax revenue sharing), compensated by a (nonproportional) decrease of central government transfers, in order to guarantee the central government´s financial sustainability. On the negative side, the negotiation of each reform has taken place under a soft budget constraint. In practice, regions tend to not exercise their autonomy in raising tax revenues (due to obvious political costs) and instead revert to demanding increased grants from the central administration to cover their budget deficits. The interface of soft budget constraints with electoral dynamics decreases the leverage of the central government for financial reforms very substantially.
A second channel through which political influence on regional financing is exercised is the allocation of the so called "territorial investment", or in other words the regional distribution of national capital investment projects, and the national co-financing of regional investment projects. This is perhaps the most opaque instrument of regional financing, and in practice allows discretionary financial treatment of certain regions in a non-transparent way. If regions with higher political leverage are in fact being favored, it is likely that the distribution of the national government's "territorial investment" will reflect such political dynamics. However, this hypothesis is especially difficult to test. In the first place, due to the difficulty in identifying in the national accounts, by region, capital investment funds from the national government that go to this type of projects.
Additionally, it would be difficult to distinguish between the exercise of discretion by the national government on investment allocation (ideally based on return on investment parameters) and political dynamics. Due to these methodological constraints, it is not possible to empirically test this hypothesis in this paper.
Hypotheses, Data and Model(s)
We will argue that political variables, and in particular the relative weight of regional parties at the national Parliament, can explain a great deal of the regional financing patterns observed in Spain in the period 1986-2006. In order to identify the political economy mechanisms through which regional financing is affected, we test the major variables explored in the literature, including the use of an indicator not previously considered in the literature on the political economy of fiscal grants in Spain: the Banzhaf voting power index.
Methodology
A dynamic panel data model is used to estimate the hypotheses. Autocorrelation is nevertheless expected in dynamic models. The amount of per capita grants is traditionally a function of the previous year, and regions would negotiate subsequent agreements on the basis of earlier financing levels, which end up establishing a "floor" for future disbursements. Accordingly, lagged values of the independent set of variables in each model are used. We use the General Methods of Moments (GMM)-based Arellano-Bond differences estimator, traditionally used for dynamic models such as this (Arellano-Bond 1991; Roodman 2006) . The rationale for the use of this estimator is that the lagged dependent variable used in the right hand side of the equation may be correlated with the error term. Thus the estimates of the coefficients may be biased. In our model specifications, there is risk of endogeneity with the explanatory variables aimed at measuring the current level of regional expenditure decentralization, as it will be discussed. The Arellano-Bond estimator partially corrects for these threats to the efficiency of the estimators.
Data
Regional fiscal data were obtained from Spain' 
Model(s)
The analysis of regional financial patterns is structured around three model specifications.
First, we analyze total regional financing, including all guaranteed (and subject to political negotiation) sources of revenues available for regions under the current framework of inter-governmental fiscal relations. This includes the Sufficiency Fund (Spain's former equalization grant to regions), revenues from shared and devolved taxes (including importantly the Income Tax, the VAT and excise taxes), revenues from fees attached to the services decentralized, and "guarantee" funds aimed to ensure regions are "hold harmless" once new functions are assigned to them. With this first model specification we start to explore whether overall financing patterns are driven by the political variables discussed in this paper as opposed to purely efficiency and equity (1) below. As discussed, with the choice of TRF as our dependent variable we implicitly argue that political bargaining may affect the distribution of regional funds through every possible source of finance guaranteed to regions and subject to political influence, and as such total regional financing becomes the best available measure for this analysis. The linear form of our model is:
α(Vector of Political Variables-1) + ε
In our fixed effects estimation, we include the lagged value of TRF in our model to account for the path dependence of regional financing. Every single reform of the regional financing system in Spain has included a "hold harmless" clause under which the reforms could never result in lower levels of financing for any given year. The set of explanatory variables in our model aims to control for the main criteria measuring both efficiency and equity in the distribution of regional financing. From the efficiency point of view, a system of regional financing should allocate funds according to regional expenditure needs and revenue generating capacity. The process of decentralization in Spain has traditionally followed an asymmetric strategy, where regions assumed expenditure responsibility at different times, depending on regional demands and capacity for self-government. Increased decentralization of government functions leads to increased expenditure needs. In addition, the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Spain displays a clear "soft budget constraint". Regional governments have increased their expenditure beyond their capacity assuming the central state would eventually provide the funds. The reality of political bargaining has consistently confirmed the success of this political strategy. As a proxy for expenditure needs, we include the log of annual recurrent expenditure per capita. This presents an obvious problem of endogeneity, as regional financing is highly correlated to the pre-devolution "effective cost" of the government services assumed by the regions. We attempt to solve this problem with the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator. All our independent variables are lagged one year, as it is expected that the results of political influences over the size and distribution of regional financing will only translate into modified transfers a year later once the budget is approved.
In order to control for equity considerations, we measured inter-regional development disparities with the log of per capita GDP. The pursuit of balanced and equitable development is one of the principles explicitly underpinning the regional financing system in Spain and as such included in our first model specification. The relative importance of this variable is however heightened in our third model. In fact, eligibility for funds from the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (or ICF hereafter), the fiscal instrument aimed at increasing equity across regions in the system, is dependent on a certain threshold of GDP per capita. Should allocations from the ICF be immune to political maneuvering, per capita GDP should largely explain the allocations under this transfer instrument.
There are multiple potential mechanisms through which political influence could have been exercised in the distribution of regional financing in Spain's case. Thus, the vector of political variables includes, in line with the literature in the area, several options to measure this potential influence.
First, we include a dummy variable measuring the coexistence of governments led by the same party at the national and regional level for every region and year. The expected sign of this coefficient is ambiguous. On the one hand, we could expect that political coexistence of government of the same party would favor larger flows of funds to those regions. However, anecdotal evidence from past negotiations seems to show that it is precisely those regions ruled by the opposition parties that, under the threat of "walking out" from the negotiations on financing reform, manage to get the better "deals". Party discipline is exerted upon regions governed by the party at the central government to accept these asymmetric deals. Politically, the party in government is thus profiled as bipartisan and consensus-prone. Using a larger database of Spanish municipalities, a recent contribution by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) shows that party alignment does positively influence the amount of grants received by municipalities from regional governments in Spain. The municipal financing system is however substantially different in design to the regional one, so the influence of partisan alignment may operate in different ways.
In addition, the vector of political variables includes a dummy variable with value one for those regions host to a regionalist party that has achieved representation at the national parliament and enters a legislature pact with the winner of the general election (a measure of influence that would be expected to translate into increased bargaining power for those regions). Two measures of "political productivity" are also incorporated: 1) the share of members of Congress (deputies) from a particular region that belong to the party currently in power (again expected to have a positive effect on regional financing the higher it is); and 2) the distance (in percentage points) between the share of votes of the party in the national government in a particular region and the winner (or runner up if won). for the major parties with parliamentary representation during the 1986-2006 period is provided in Table 3, while in Table 4 variable labels and descriptions are offered. During the period under study, only two regionalist parties achieved the required voting power so as to be pivotal on regional financing reform, CiU (Catalonian) and PNV (Basque), who formed legislature pacts with the national government between 1993 and 2000. However, perhaps only CiU would be amenable of the kind of political bargaining we discuss in this paper. Due to a set of historical circumstances, the Basque Autonomous Region enjoys a fiscal system different from the rest of country 16 , whereby all revenue collection -except for Social Security payments-is under the responsibility of the regional government, who returns a certain share ("el cupo", defined by formula) to the central government. Thus, it is unlikely that the PNV would have used up its new gained parliamentary power on the reform of a system that largely does not apply to its region. There is the possibility however that PNV's political leverage is used to renegotiate downwards the contribution the Basque Country makes to the consolidated revenue fund. Due to the different fiscal regime enjoyed by the Basque Country and Navarre, our decision is to eliminate these two regions from our database in order to homogenize the observations.
The region of Catalonia enjoys however the fiscal regime common to the rest of the 
Results
The results of the first model, using the natural logarithm of total per capita regional financing as dependent variable are shown in Table 5 . Overall levels of regional financing are, as expected, significantly determined by the main variables measuring efficiency and equity of the system. As expected, the level of per capita financing in a given year is highly determined by the previous year's, reflecting the influence of the "hold-harmless" approach that has defined every reform of the system. The results are consistent for the different model specifications defined. Recurrent expenditure per capita, as a proxy measuring the share of goods and services delivered at the regional level, is highly significant throughout the different model specifications. As this variable approximates the level of decentralization of expenditure responsibilities at the regional level, it shows as expected a positive correlation with the level of financing. There is admittedly a certain level of endogeneity associated to this variable, but it did not seem to affect the results for the political variables that form the core of the analysis.
An interesting result is the significant and negative correlation between the per capita GDP and the level of regional financing. We should recall that our variable measuring total regional financing does not include allocations for the transfer instruments defined to address inter-regional inequalities, namely, the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund and the European Cohesion Fund (of similar objectives at a European scale). Instead, it aggregates the transfers defined to ensure an efficient delivery of services on the basis of the functions decentralized to the regions. The correlation coefficient between regional recurrent expenditure and per capita GDP is high at .74, reflecting this trend.
Our results show that a one percentage point increase in per capita GDP reduces total regional financing by .74 percent. From a horizontal equity viewpoint, this would be a positive result, especially considering all sources of regional financing are included in the dependent variable of our first model.
The voting power of the major Catalonian political party (CiU) is a significant determinant of total regional financing, in line with the political analysis shown above.
When in need of legislature pacts, national parties have always tended to search for parliamentary support on regionalist parties. The only other feasible alternative for a coalition partner, the party of the former communists, was traditionally discarded for ideological reasons, as it would have signaled departure from moderate positions. In fact,
CiU has formed part of every legislature pact from 1993 to 2000, regardless of the sign of the party in power. Its political influence has thus extended beyond the mere regional scale to the whole of the regional financing system.
The positive sign of the coefficient shows that an increase in CiU's voting power is highly correlated with increases in total regional financing, controlling for all of other major determinants of regional funding. The variable's economic significance appears to be relatively small. A ten point increase in the value of the Banzhaf index for CiU translates into a 0.33 percent increase in total regional financing. This is likely due to the fact that all guaranteed regional sources of financing are included in the dependent variable, while their vulnerability to political negotiation varies. The result underlines equally the critical role that CiU has played in extending expenditure and revenue power to the Spanish regions and the overall level of decentralization. 
Coexistence_1
Dummy variable with value 1 for a region and year where the same party is at + government at the national and regional level, zero otherwise. Lagged one year.
Coalnac_1
Dummy variable with value 1 for a region and year when a regional party from + that region is on a legislature pact with the current central government.
Sldr_1
Share of Local Deputies for the party in power in that region and year -Ppdws_1 Difference in votes, in percentage points between the winner and second in -national elections, at the regional level.
PSOE_1
Value of Banzhaf Index for Socialist Party - The result is however more important in light of the negative significance of any other variable measuring political influence in the process. Neither the political productivity indexes nor the dummy variables measuring partisan alignment or legislature pacts showed to be of explanatory power.
As expected, the results showed significant changes in the years in which the reforms were implemented. With the exception of 1987, the first years of implementation of reforms to the financing system (i.e. 1992, 1997 and 2001) showed significant jumps associated to the changes. In addition, year 1994, the first in which a legislature pact was reached between a national party and CiU, was equally significant. In 1993 (first implemented in 1994) 15 percent of the collection from the personal income tax was assigned to the regions as part of the financing system, which may affect the results
observed.
Models 2 and 3 analyze, respectively, the determinants of two of the main grant instruments in Spain, the Sufficiency Fund and the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund.
In Model 2, we test whether the Sufficiency Fund has been distributed according to the efficiency principles it was designed for (i.e. provide sufficient financing for the delivery of decentralized goods and services) or if political maneuvering may be behind the observed patterns. The results, shown in Table 6 , again lend support to the hypothesis that the increased voting power in Parliament of CiU has impacted the level of overall regional financing allocated through the Sufficiency Fund. This time, evidence of a stronger impact is reflected in the size of the coefficient. A ten percentage points increase in the voting power of CiU in Parliament (equivalent to 1.5 standard deviations from the mean) increases the size of the Sufficiency Fund by 3 percent, a more sizeable increase than if total regional financing is used as the dependent variable.
The resources distributed via the Sufficiency Fund are mostly determined by the levels of recurrent expenditure, the best available indicator of the level of decentralization. From that point of view, the results seem to show the distribution of funds is consistent with the objectives defined for this fiscal instrument. Corroborating earlier results, we found that the sign of the coefficient measuring the impact of per capita GDP on the Sufficiency fund is negative. The coefficient however was not significant, although its sign remains consistent through the different model specifications. The lack of significance, throughout all model specifications, of traditional variables of the literature, such as the existence of coalition governments, voting productivity indexes and the coexistence of the same party in government at the central and regional level is equally remarkable. The results, for instance, would support the hypothesis that, in order for the central government to reach agreements on the new regional financing frameworks over the years, the party in government not only has not favored those regions where it rules, but has exacted greater financial commitments from them in order to ensure the viability of the system (and thus the negative sign of the coefficient).
In Model 3, we analyze the determinants of the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund, the grant instrument aimed at assisting poorer regions to "catch up" with average national development levels, thus aligned with the normative principle of equity. The results seem to show that the overall level of financing distributed from the Compensation Fund has been invulnerable to political maneuvering. This a logical conclusion in line with the rest of our results, since Catalonia has not received funds from this source since the early 1990s and thus it has been absent from the political agenda of the Catalonian party. None of the political variables defined are significant in any of the estimations and model specifications. This may not be surprising considering the relatively small size of total financing it represents. Its distribution also could have been affected by the allocation of European Union Structural Funds. Accordingly, a control is included in the second specification of this model, but the distribution of EU structural funds proved to be non significant. 
Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the political determinants of sub-national government financing system by analyzing the case of the largely decentralized Kingdom of Spain. Using a dynamic panel data we test the impact of the increase in political bargaining power of Spain's regionalist parties in the total level of regional financing and on the two major transfer mechanisms.
Our results show that the rise in parliamentary importance of the major regionalist party in Spain, CiU, is partly responsible for the significant increase in total regional financing observed during the 1986-2006 period. By spearheading negotiations within the common regional financing system in Spain, the weight of its political influence during the period 1993-2000 has translated into benefits shared by all Spanish regions. None of the other major avenues for political influence discussed in the literature and relevant to the Spanish case were found significant on this analysis.
Ideally, an intergovernmental fiscal system should be isolated from political bargaining that may lead to sub-optimal financing and "soft-budget constraints". In Spain, the deficient estimation of regional expenditure needs (based on obsolete historical costs) limits the dynamic adjustments of the regional financing system, added to the political leverage of regionalist parties at the national parliament (exemplified by CiU) has resulted in an evident soft-budget constraint where regions increase their expenditure confident that the next reform of the system will bring an increase in transfers.
To avoid this situation, reforms must be designed to adapt the current system of regional financing to the evolving needs of the regions, and reduce the strategic behavior of regional governments.
